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Knowledge Issues In The Introduction of CRM Systems: 
Tacit Knowledge, Psychological Contracts, Subcultures and Impacts 
 
David Finnegan and Leslie Willcocks, Warwick Business School, Warwick University  





This exploratory case study research applies a processual analysis (Pettigrew, 1997) to the 
implementation of a Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system from a knowledge 
management perspective to a contemporary (1999-2004) situation within Birmingham City Council.  
A specific focus is given to areas neglected in previous CRM studies - sub-cultures, psychological 
contracts, how tacit knowledge is surfaced and transferred, and with what effects on implementation.  
It investigates how the system stakeholders and the information system (IS) itself evolved through 
encountering barriers, sharing knowledge, finding new uses, inventing work-arounds. A rich picture 
emerges of sub-cultural silos of knowledge linked with psychological contracts and power-based 
relationships influencing and inhibiting adoption and acceptance of the CRM system. 
  
Keywords: Knowledge Management, Customer Relationship Management Systems, Psychological 
Contracts, Implementation  
 
     
 
1.        Introduction 
CRM is emerging as a key element in system integration. It has attracted a lot of attention, a 
high failure rate, but also CRM systems remain very understudied academically. Linkages between 
knowledge transfer and psychological contracts also remain understudied in the implementation of a 
CRM, or indeed any other, system.   Exploratory intensive case research is a highly useful device for 
providing insights into these issues. The research was carried out as part of a processual analysis 
(Pettigrew 1997) to understand the process of implementation of a CRM system from a knowledge 
perspective in a contemporary situation in one organization.  The research intends to secure an 
improved understanding of the mechanisms and patterns of the implementation processes of a CRM 
system at Birmingham City Council, United Kingdom. After a critique of the relevant literature, we 
detail the research methodology, then describe, analyze and draw implications from the case. 
 
2.       Literature Review  
There are five research literatures relevant to this study, that can usefully be brought together 
to provide a lens for analysing the selected case history. These studies cover IT implementation, 
organizational cultures and sub-cultures, knowledge and its transfer, psychological contracts, and 
Customer Relationship Management (CRM) systems. 
On implementation, Rogers (1983) has identified five conceptual characteristics of 
innovations that help explain adoption rates: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability 
and observability. The research literature supports strongly Rogers’ (1983) first three characteristics as 
major determinants of IS success or failure defined typically in terms of IS usage and/or user 
satisfaction with the system (Cooper and Zmud 1990; Kwon and Zmud 1987; Tornatzki and Klein 
982). Kwon and Zmud (1987) developed a stage model of implementation, while Davis (1989) argued 
that perceived usefulness is a strong correlate of user acceptance. In such representative studies, the 
importance of knowledge sharing and shared psychological contracts is implicit, but not explicitly 
stated or researched. Davidson (2002) argues that frames and shifts in frame salience influence sense-
making during requirement determination, while Orlikowski and Gash (1994) show shared frames as 
closely related to the concept of subcultures. According to Geertz (1973) and Van Maanen and Barley 
(1985), subcultures rely heavily on cognitive elements such as common frames of reference. 
Pre-existing structures and cultures may shape differing stakeholder perceptions regarding the 
new system and its implementation and performance. While the literature on organizational culture is 
large, that referring explicitly to IT implementation is surprisingly small.  An early survey done by 
Waterhouse (1991, 1992) found  47 percent of UK IT directors stating that their main problem was the 
culture gap existing between IT and business professionals, with 56 percent believing that the culture 
gap was losing or seriously delaying IT opportunities for their company to gain competitive 
advantage. The management literature is replete with various subsequent attempts made to improve 
the communication and participation between the subcultures to enable a successful implementation of 
an IT system (Wright-Cummings, 1997). However, these efforts have rarely investigated the factors 
enabling and inhibiting communication across subcultures from a knowledge perspective (for 
examples see Louis, 1985; Boland and Tenkasi 1996; Nonaka 1994; Davis and Olson 1985; Mumford 
et al. 1978; Bostrom and Heinen (1977); Checkland 1981; IBM 1977). These studies showed that the 
need for improving communication between subcultures is vital. These attempts so far, however, have 
not investigated in depth the cultures within IS implementation, but especially  the ‘culture behind the 
clicks’ represented by the developers, programmers and technicians,  and the resulting distinctive 
perspective on the implementation process that might result.  
 Strong hierarchical enterprises prevent smooth cross-functional communication and 
consequently inhibit cross-functional cooperation or knowledge sharing. Breaking down hierarchies 
can enable knowledge transfer (Nonaka 1994). However, organisations that maintain hierarchical 
levels and silos will not encourage it. Knowledge in such organisations frequently becomes ’sticky’ 
that is, residing in one area or silo and not easily moved to the other parts of the organisation (Bartlett 
     
 
and Ghoshal 1998). The non-codified techniques play an important role in industrial production and in 
technical and technological innovation (Perrin 1990). 
Anderson and Schalk (1998); Makin et al. (1996); Rousseau (1995); Shore and Barksdale 
(1998); Thibaut & Kelley, (1959) argue that psychological contracts play an important role in the 
outcome of interaction between individuals. Psychological contracts can link to knowledge issues 
where knowledge is construed as situated practice and as culture, and culturally and historically 
specific tools and concepts (Brown 1998; Schulze and Leidner 2002). The extent to which an 
employee and employer feel obligated to one another takes place as follows: mutual high obligations, 
mutual low obligations, employee over-obligation, and employee under-obligation (Shore and 
Barksdale 1998).Whilst studying a variety of psychological contracts, Janssens et. al. (2003) used a 
feature-oriented approach across a large, representative sample that covered different hierarchical 
layers and relevant professional categories. Six different clusters were found: loyal, instrumental, 
weak, unattached, investing and strong. These were discovered to have different patterns of employer 
and employee obligations, a different profile and different levels of affective commitment and 
employability. This study, however, does not explore a relationship between the type of psychological 
contracts and the knowledge transfer. To date few links have been established between knowledge 
transfer and psychological contracts. 
 A survey done by ‘The Data Warehousing Institute’ (TDWI Industry Study, 2000) found that 
41 % of the organisations with CRM projects were either experiencing difficulties or close to failure. 
The survey further revealed that 91 % either have or plan to deploy a CRM solution in the near future, 
but that only 22% of companies have appointed a chief customer officer to facilitate change. Failure 
rates of CRM projects may be as high as 70 % (Tafti 2002). As Ciborra (2000) bluntly states, "CRM 
seems to have no built-in mechanisms by which it acquires its own momentum and (by which) the 
diffusion becomes a self-feeding process”. The studies so far have looked into the macro level 
interaction in the paradox of CRM. This research will investigate the micro level interactions in a 
‘transformational’ CRM project (Goodhue et al. 2002). 
 Our review has aimed to integrate of disparate literatures in order to provide a set of lenses 
and concepts to further study the introduction of a CRM system. This integration is shown in Figure 1.  






IT Implementation Process 
Complexity (Rogers 1983) 
Adaptation, acceptance, routinisation and infusion (Kwon and Zmud 1987) 
Differential interest, expectations, perceptions (Long and Fahey 2000) 
Role of IT as enabler (Avgerou 2000) 
‘Process’ in Pettigrew’s (1985) five-fold framework 
Orlikowski and Tyre (1994);  Orlikowski W.J, Hofman D (1997;  Orlikowski W.J and Iacono C.S. (2001) 
Changing Frames, Orlikowski and Gash (1991);  Technology Frames,  Orlikowski and Gash (1994)  
IS Implementation Myers (1995, 2003), Walsham and Waema  (1994) 
Technology Frames and Framing, Davidson  (2002) 
IT Implementation and Culture  
• Organisational Culture, Corporate Culture 
     (Alvesson 2002). 
• Culture led change (Claver et al. 2001) 
• High and low context culture (Agar 1994) 
• Mechanistic and Organic Culture (Burns and Stalker 1961) 
Knowledge Management 
• Spiral of organizational knowledge creation (Nonaka et al. 
1996). 
• Knowledge Creation, Knowledge diffusion and 
implementation knowledge use (Rogers 1995) 
• Agenda formation, Selection /Implementation 
Routinization (Clark et al. 1992) 
• Networking approach, community approach and cognitive 
approach (Newell et al. 2002) 
Subcultures and Culture Gap 
• Boundary between the "technical" and 
the "social"  (Bloomfield and Vurdubakis 
1994) 
• Culture gap between IT and business 
professionals  (Waterhouse 1991, 1992) 
• Culture gap between computer specialists 
and business users (Fincham 1994; 
Grindley 1992; Hinton 1994; Kumar and 
Bjorn-Andersen 1990) 
Knowledge Transfer & Psychological Contracts 
• Breaking down hierarchies (Nonaka, 1994) 
• Non-codified techniques  (Perrin 1990) 
• Mutual perspective taking (Boland and Tenkasi, 1996) 
• knowing of what others know (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) 
• T-shaped skills 
(Iansiti, 1993)  
• Shared context for knowing (Newell et al., 2002)  
• Thompson  and Walsham (2004) 
• Psychological Contracts 
• (Anderson and Schalk, 1998; Janssens et al. , 2003; 
Makin et al. 1996; Rousseau 1990, 1995; Thibaut & Kelley 
1959) 
• Perceived obligations, Shore and Barksdale (1998)
• Sub-cultures at different 
level of hierarchies 
(management) 
Knowledge Transfer  
Aids/ Barriers 
• Hierarchies (Nonaka, 1994) 
• Differences in cognitive and emotional 
orientations  
    (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967) 
• Silo/Sticky Knowledge  
   (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998) 
• Creative abrasion (Leonard - 
    Barton 1995) 
• Illusion of consensus (Gee 1992) 
• Fear as an emotion 
    (Pfeffer and Sutton 1999) 
• Informal setting (Van- Maanen 1986)
Explicit Knowledge 
• Descriptive and transcriptive 
knowledge (Vincenti 1993) 
• Externalisation (Nonaka and 
Takuchi 1995) 
• Analogies and metaphors  
(Nelson and Cooprider  
1996)
Tacit Knowledge 
• Tricks of the trade 
     (Vincenti 1984 Orlikowski    
and Tyre 1994) 
• Tacit Knowledge is implicit  
     (Polanyi 1967) 
 
• Sub-culture behind the clicks 
representing the IT experts. 
 
• Sub-culture representing 
end-users 
 




The literature review gives a special focus to sub-
cultures, and how tacit knowledge is surfaced and 
transferred, and with what effect on the adaptation and 
acceptance of a CRM system. 
Implementation of CRM Systems: 
Failure rates of CRM projects may be as high as 70 % (Tafti 2002). 
"CRM seems to have no built-in mechanisms by which it acquires its own momentum and (by which) the diffusion becomes a 
self-feeding process”, (Ciborra 2000). 
TDWI Industry Study, 2000 found that 41 % of the organisations with CRM projects were either experiencing difficulties or 
close to failure. 
     
 
Figure 1:               Hierarchy of Linkages between IT System Implementation, IT Implementation and 
Culture, and Knowledge Management Issues.   
3. Research Approach  
Initial analysis of issues regarding knowledge transfer across the key subcultures of the 
implementation process of a CRM system, has generated the following exploratory organizing 
research questions: 
        (a)   ‘How is tacit knowledge surfaced and transferred across, or blocked and 
contained within key subcultures and with what effect on the adaptation and 
acceptance of a CRM system?’ 
 
        (b) What is the role of psychological contracts in the process of CRM systems 
implementation?  
This study uses Pettigrew’s (1985) five-fold framework to analyse the internal and 
external contexts, history and the process and content of change. The framework has been 
widely used in management of change and IS research (Margetts and Willcocks 1994). Time 
and history are central to processual analysis, enhancing the understanding of the 
contemporary situation at the research site (Pettigrew 1997). We employ a longitudinal case 
study approach to collect and critically analyse empirical data. The research into the period 2001-2005 
was carried out across the period January 2003 to August 2004. The case study approach is the most 
commonly used qualitative method for research in information systems (Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991). 
The techniques for collecting data included historical analyses, including data from project reports and 
minutes of project team meetings; attending informal staff meetings; participant observation; and 
conducting interviews with stakeholders. The use of observation as a method of data collection is well 
documented (Bell 1992). The variety of methods chosen to gather data (historical analyses, interviews 
and taking of field notes) created a useful form of triangulation (Yin 1994).  According to King 
(1994), an in-depth interview is a direct personal interview in which a single respondent is probed by 
an interviewer to uncover underlying motivations, beliefs, attitudes and feelings on a topic. It has a 
low degree of structure, a high proportion of open questions and a focus on specific situations and 
action sequences in the interview process (King 1994). Fifteen semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with the stakeholders of the CRM system. The interviews were loosely structured 
consisting of open-ended questions mapping the area to be explored, at least initially, whilst allowing 
the interviewer or interviewee to diverge in order to pursue an idea or response in more detail. 
Interviewees included people from senior management, middle management, technologists, and end-
users of the CRM system at each site. Having transcribed the recorded interviews, colour coding was 
used to help in analysing the data. Colour coding helped to increase the consistency of the analysis. It 
also facilitated searching, marking up, linking and reorganising data in a short period of time (Denzin 
and Lincoln 2000). The data from key stakeholders from different sites were compared to find the 
similarities and dissimilarities across the case. We recognised throughout that the process of sifting 
and sense-making developed an interpretation of interpretations (Stanmark 2000).  The approach and 
assumptions of this research fall into the interpretive discourse as defined by Schulze and Leidner 
(2002).  
 
4.          Case Study:  Birmingham City Council (BCC) 
4.1           History and Context 
Under this section we describe briefly the history and context for IT at BCC. Birmingham City has 
evolved from being the UK’s cultural capital to one of Europe’s premiere conference and public 
events cities. Birmingham is a lively, prosperous and cosmopolitan city, offering a rich mix of culture, 
history, shopping, community life and the arts. At the heart of this vibrant community is Birmingham 
City Council (BCC), which comprises 11 parliamentary constituencies, 39 electoral wards and more 
than one million people. Around 1994 senior management made a decision to move from a centralised 
IT structure to increased autonomy over buying and outsourcing of IT services by departments. As a 
     
 
result, the role of central IT became more of a support function (Tricia Thrupp, CRM Project Manager 
at BCC IT Services) According to Willcocks and Margetts (1994) the newness and attractiveness 
(convenience/pricing) of technology led many public sector organisations, including BCC, to expose 
themselves to consultancy and supplier markets.  
The following enlarges on the impact of the external context on the internal context, affecting 
BCC’s IT strategic planning (Pettigrew 1997). According to Tricia Thrupp, each department at BCC 
over the years has become increasingly autonomous in terms of its IT:  
 “We’ve got very few truly corporate solutions. We’ve got a finance system and we’ve got an HR 
system, beyond that, because we’ve got lots of different businesses and we’ve tried to look at SIP for 
example. But it always needs so much tweaking when it gets out into the departments that it’s 
always cheaper to go and buy an off-the-shelf propriety Leisure system / propriety Environmental 
Services system / propriety Museum system.”  
According to this CRM project manager, ‘vanilla’ applications seemed to be popular in BCC 
as they require less in-house expertise, a general trend elsewhere also (Parr and Shanks 2000) Tony 
Glew, head of BCC IT up to October 2001, justified outsourcing in this way: 
 “When I was here I was the Head of IT and I had a staff of about 70 or 80 IT staff, but the IT staff 
were business analysts and system analysts and they weren’t programmers. There were one or two 
people who were experts in Lotus Notes, but we didn’t have programmers like COBOL 
programmers or anything like that. The programming assignments had all been outsourced to IT 
NET in 1989.” 
In-house implementation and development expertise during that period was limited. In 
particular, it lacked programmers; IT expertise was in the form of business or system analysts. 
According to Glew, when they chose new packages they really had to be good, and not require a lot of 
technical skill to make them work. Thus BCC lacked a balanced mix of technical and business 
expertise, something seen as an inhibitor in previous implementation studies (see for example, Parr 
and Shanks 2000). As a result, the role of the IT centre was diverted into supporting departments 
which would go out to buy solutions to meet their individual needs.  
Various applications developed without consideration of a strategy for integration. Tricia 
Thrupp saw system integration as a particularly difficult task:  
“Everything’s a balancing act, isn’t it?  But that’s the situation we’ve inherited and that’s why 
today (2004) when you say, ‘Try to join things up.’ Why are we so keen on trying to get an 
integration strategy together that enables us to do that?  Because it isn’t simply a case of saying! 
Well we’ve got four or five core systems; we’ve got hundreds of systems out there, hundreds and 
hundreds that do all sorts of different things in different ways.” 
Thus it would seem that IT solutions were bought in by different departments with little regard 
for cross departmental integration resulting in similar technology bottlenecks as recorded by Holland 
and Ben (1999) in their study of ERP systems implementation.  BCC has realised over the last few 
years that it is not efficient as an organisation and a lot of things that have been done on the 
re-organisation of IT since 1999 have been about trying to re-establish standards, though not without 
difficulties:  
 “But you can only go so far, with our re-organisation. I’d have loved to have said, ‘Right! All IT 
staff are now centralised.’ But that’s going too far because the departments have (are used to) their 
autonomy and won’t release.” (Tricia Thrupp).  
The literature suggests that subcultures formed as a result of the above IT autonomy may have 
different interests, expectations and power (Long and Fahey 2000). A further investigation (below) of 
these subcultures in different departments will assist in understanding knowledge transfer 
mechanisms.  
 
4.2        Impact of Political Directives In The ‘Outer Context’  
It is important to understand the larger political context and its impacts for a UK city council 
like Birmingham.  According to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2000), the government has 
stated its commitment to promoting continuous improvement in local government services through 
electronic service delivery (ESD), to achieve the target of 100% ESD capability by 2005. Furthermore, 
     
 
this vision intends to modernise the way public sector delivers policies, programmes and services to its 
customers/citizens. The above illustrates the government deadlines and speed of new legislation that 
Willcocks and Margetts (1994) talk about as pressure factors, pushing the organisations towards 
consultant and supplier markets.  
  Interactive Electronic Government (IEG) aims to build local government services around 
customer/citizens’ needs rather than the organisational structures of service providers, giving its 
customers a one-stop service.  All levels of government have been encouraged to make full use of the 
potential for electronic service delivery to improve the responsiveness and quality of service. This is 
where the IEG directive links with the idea of a CRM system, as proponents of CRM systems claim to 
facilitate a one-stop shop for customers. New technology should not replace personal contact but it 
should make it better supported (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2002). The Government's 
agenda, according to the office of Deputy Prime Minister, has been driven by social expectations and 
comparisons with the private sector - such as people's expectations to be able to deal with 
organisations by many different means, not just traditional face-to-face contact.  
 
4.3        The Internal Context at BCC  
In this section the subcultures and subculture-gaps at BCC are discussed, using theories from 
the literature review (Louis 1985; Fincham 1994; Grindley 1992; Hinton 1994; Kumar and Bjorn-
Andersen 1990). Several subcultures were identified during the research at BCC. The CRM project 
was originally perceived to have an IT-led approach. The revised approach after Tony Glew left in 
October 2001 was perceived as business led. According to James Druary (Contract Manager, 
Corporate Customer Relations), one group of people (led by Tony Glew) had a positive attitude 
towards CRM implementation with an integrative approach, while the other group (led by Sarah 
Wood) had a less integrative, more ‘call-answering’ focus: 
 “As a result of that, the priority has gone into that area rather than developing CRM, collecting a 
lot of data about customers, using that data to shape services in the future. That’s the area that’s 
still weak at the moment (mid 2004).”  
This points to a cultural gap between the social and technical  (Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 
1994), that is, in this context, between the human resource department, service agents, end users, and 
some managers on the one hand, and the programmers, IT technicians, developers and systems 
analysts on the other. The IT-led group, including Tony Glew, David Hall and the consultant Bill 
Newman, were concerned about establishing a strong link between the front- and back-offices using 
middleware to integrate the system, as we have seen in other systems implementations (Holland and 
Ben 1999; Louis 1985). Initially, the middleware design proved insufficient, and this slowed down the 
process of implementation. Hence, a non-integrative approach, under Sarah Wood, supported by Julie 
Bullen and other like-minded people, was taken on board as a better alternative. The problematic 
nature of the differing cultures created a further hurdle with some serious consequences in the form of 
people leaving the project, thus slowing down implementation progress – an issue with parallels in 
other implementations (Bloomfield and Vurdubakis 1994; Price Waterhouse 1991, 1992).  
General problems arose when different departments wanted to communicate with each other 
without the necessary system integration. This situation was not helped by the fact that departments 
had gathered knowledge over the years that some found hard to release without seeing any clear 
benefits. As Davenport et al. (1998) argue, individuals sitting with certain knowledge may have fear of 
losing their power or position by releasing their knowledge completely. At BCC, according to David 
Hall: 
 “This type of knowledge hoarding has given rise to vertical silos in BCC at a departmental level.”  
According to Leonard-Barton and Kraus (1985), making the knowledge residing in such 
vertical silos more mobile across departments is an important facilitator of implementation. Such 
knowledge possessed by the departments can be in explicit or implicit state, both codified and non-
codified (Perrin 1990). In other words, it can be in descriptive, prescriptive or tacit form (Vincenti 
1993; Nonaka et al. 1995; Herschbach 1995). It becomes vital to investigate the elements that facilitate 
the transfer of knowledge residing in various forms across the departmental subcultures at BCC.   
 
     
 
4.4        Moving Towards CRM: The ‘Content’ of IT-Related Change  
Here we address the Content factor in our data-gathering framework. By late 1998 BCC was 
concerned about their public call-answering capacity. BCC had been looking at establishing a 
corporate contact centre for a number of years.   According to several respondents, one of the key 
requirements identified was the need to set up some form of corporate access database. By doing so, 
they could record and monitor the contacts and “that would be an important component of any 
contact centre that was established - and that’s when we started looking at CRM as an issue” (Tony 
Glew).   
According to David Hall, Chief Executive, Sir Michael Lyons, at the time, was well aware of 
the protracted dialogue that had taken place. He further argued that it had never really had a project 
champion, so when Tony Glew suggested that Central IT take up the initiative, the CEO endorsed his 
suggestion. David Hall further suggested that the CEO was most keen to improve the communications 
with the public, and felt that everything was too spread over the Authority. The project thus gained a 
project sponsor in the form of the CEO, one of the strong recommendations coming out of parallel 
research on IT project implementation (see for example Goodhue et al. 2002; Willcocks and Sykes 
2000).  
 
4.5        Preparations for the Process  
This section will begin to link ‘Content’ with ‘Process’ and highlight the mechanisms and 
patterns embedded in the interaction between the stakeholders and their impact on the process of 
implementation (Pettigrew 1997).  
Tony Glew started to work with the idea of a CRM system as a solution to the BCC call 
answering problem: 
 “There’s another key character, who is still working here called Gerry McMullen. Gerry is 
brilliant. Gerry sees things, brings them all together and if you ask the right questions, out it all 
comes into a strategic whole.  It was Gerry that told me, ‘This is what’s its really about, Tony, not 
just answering the phone but connecting the agents to the back office systems and logging 
everything in the middle.’….  So immediately we started developing the idea for a government 
computing conference’ 
The first big presentation on CRM was in 1999 to a government computing conference. On 
that occasion Tony Glew had spoken of every Authority in the country having its own CRM, but all 
linked together through the Internet, so any citizen anywhere could actually link into the CRM. Tony’s 
idea was received positively. The BCC Deputy Leader (Andy Howell) was interested in promoting 
modern techniques. He got Tony Glew and Sarah Wood (Strategic Director of Resources) together and 
gave them the project go-ahead.  Significantly Tony and Sarah held different and potentially 
conflicting underlying views that did not surface until a later stage of the CRM project, an issue that 
appeared also in research by Pliskin et al. (1993).  
According to Krogh,, Ichijo, and Nonaka, (2000), effective knowledge creation depends on 
the physical, virtual and emotional context of an organisation. They discuss the importance of the 
notion of reciprocity of relationships. When a relationship is felt to be reciprocal then a trust develops 
which can work to overcome power-based relationships. Relationships between Tony Glew and Sarah 
Wood were not felt to be reciprocal. This resulted in lack of trust from both sides. Their psychological 
contracts were low on trust and loyalty, resulting from conflicting ideas, motives and interests. A 
mutual perspective towards CRM Frontline was absent (Boland and Tenkasi 1996). 
 
4.6        Outsourcing Of Implementation   
According to Tony Glew, BCC needed somebody that had the right implementation experience. 
Consultant Bill Newman, who had a good track record, was employed from May 2000.  However, 
much of his experience was from the private sector, which differs from the public sector in several 
distinctive ways (Willcocks and Harrow 1992).  Together with Bill Newman, three more consultants 
were hired. 
One of these consultants was John Harlow, with a background in work study for over 20 years 
in the public sector. He also had experience in call centres and script design. He was hired to do 
     
 
business process re-engineering in terms of process analysis in relation to the targeted areas for a 
contact centre. Peter McMahon and Derek Forland were the other two consultants. Their initial role 
was to investigate neighbourhood offices and council tax. Bill Newman’s role was to manage the 
consultants and also to act as an advisor to Tony Glew. The hired consultants lacked specific 
knowledge of BCC culture and its operations.  This necessitated their working closely with BCC if 
they were to acquire that type of knowledge and share their own knowledge in order to facilitate 
knowledge transfer in both directions (Bowen 1998). 
From May 2000 onwards, BCC went through a process of putting requirements together with 
a view to going out to tender. Birmingham had only 39 systems-facing people, so:  
“We’d better get in bed with somebody who’s very good at doing integration, because we 
aren’t.” (Tony Glew). 
BCC entered into contract negotiations with Lagan, the provider of software called Frontline. 
BCC also went on a site visit to Sussex Police in Brighton during October/November 2000 to observe 
their gazetteer using a CRM application. In December 2000, the decision to sign with Lagan was 
made, the contract being finalised in March 2001. An off-the-shelf package was chosen, that could be 
configured and implemented fairly quickly. There were also possibilities for back-office integration 
through an in-built XML facility in the package.  
 
4.7        The ‘Process’ of CRM Implementation January 2001 – April 2002  
This section covers the ‘how’ of the implementation - how things were done and how they were 
perceived by different stakeholders (Pettigrew 1985, 1997). 
 
4.7.1 Staff Retention Issues 
            During Jan 2001, Julie Bullen was appointed as a business manager for the CRM project. 
According to Bob Carter, temporary head of IT: 
 “It was felt that the project was over-weighted with IT and light on business need. The business 
need according to Sarah Wood, Strategic Director of Resources was to bring back the focus towards 
call answering issues.”  
According to a 2001 Citizen Mori poll, the number of people who could actually get through 
to BCC was as low as 10% on first call. 
 
4.7.2     CRM project manager resigns from the CRM project 
David Hall was the CRM Project Manager when Julie Bullen arrived during May 2001.  Julie Bullen 
and David Hall got off to a bad start. David Hall got on very well with the consultant, but Julie Bullen 
did not. This could have perhaps caused some of the subsequent problems: 
“It was a delicate issue but perhaps it did come down a lot to personalities at the end of the day.” 
(Tricia Thrupp)  
According to Tricia Thrupp, shortly after that, when Julie arrived and had different views 
about how the project should be run, it was felt better that David Hall leave the project. Furthermore, 
with the arrival of Julie Bullen as business manager, the project changed direction towards a call 
answering focus and away from the integrated approach focus. David Hall did not share that view 
either, and duly left the project. That is also when Tricia Thrupp became the CRM Project Manager:  
“My management style is different from Dave’s management style, I had clear views about where I 
wanted it to go and they didn’t quite fit with the views of both Dave and the consultant (Bill 
Newman).  I didn’t feel there was enough business ownership so I decided that we needed to refresh 
the team.”(Julie Bullen). 
David Hall felt let down by the senior management, as he was there before Julie arrived. The 
non-reciprocal psychological contracts present between Sarah Wood and Tony Glew can also be seen 
between Julie Bullen and David Hall. A process of ‘mutual perspective taking’ where distinctive 
individual knowledge is exchanged, evaluated and integrated with that of the others in the 
organisation, was missing in the above case also, with, following Boland and Tenkasi (1996), equally 
deleterious consequences.  
 
     
 
4.7.3     Head of IT (Tony Glew) left BCC (October 2001) 
Sarah Wood wanted to outsource the call centre management to Vertex, who were partners 
with Lagan. Tony Glew, on the other hand, had a view that it might slow things down. He was keen on 
back-office integration in the system. His view was shared by both David Hall and Bill Newman. 
Strategically, Sarah took a different view. According to Tony Glew:  
 “Her view was ‘To hell with boys playing…. much more important is - Get the telephones 
answered!’”  
Tony Glew gave six months notice before leaving during October 2001.   
 
4.7.4     Change of direction in the ‘Process’ (October 2001) 
Sarah Wood decided to outsource to Vertex as Tony Glew left during Oct 2001. Outsourcing 
to Vertex was more of a political decision as there were issues with regard to the performance of 
officers providing service. Andy Howell appeared to be the person pushing this idea forward.   
In April 2001 consultant Bill Newman presented a report to Sarah Wood, in which he 
promoted the idea of integration between front and back office using Frontline. That idea was never 
acted upon. Bill Newman was relieved of his services. The rest of the consultants were assigned the 
role of designing scripts for the contact centre.  In normal circumstances the City Council would have 
moved all the call centre staff over to the contact centre, necessitating transfer of undertakings legally. 
The politicians were not prepared to do that. According to Bob Carter, they seconded people from 
BCC to Vertex. In this arrangement, the management of the staff was done by Vertex. However, all 
the staff’s terms and conditions were managed by the City Council.  
 
4.7.5     Stakeholder commitment  
BCC CRM implementation had senior management sponsorship in the form of Sir Michael 
Lyons, the chief executive, who saw a CRM system in action on his trip to Brisbane. According to 
David Hall: 
 “Andy Howell saw this as a good opportunity to kill two birds with one stone. One, this would 
eliminate the call answering issues that the city was having. The second, that implementation of a 
CRM system will be in line with the government directive.” 
As Glew and Wood started to work on the implementation plan, their differing opinions 
became more explicit. They may have started with a mutual understanding on the surface (Anderson 
and Schalk 1998). As they interacted more closely and creative abrasion took place, the implicit part 
of their psychological contract became more explicit, and, following (Makin et al. 1996), more 
obviously misaligned.  Where the psychological contract was previously implicit, this had resulted in a 
lack of clarity for both parties on the level of their disagreement (Maken et al. 1996). 
 Creative abrasion can positively influence performance (Leonard-Barton 1995). In this case, 
however, it created a divide and slowed down the CRM project. This also resulted in Tony Glew’s 
resignation, and subsequent suspension of the original ‘Frontline’ development in favour of the revised 
‘Contact Birmingham Frontline’ solution.  
The arrival of Julie Bullen as business manager decisively changed the direction of the project 
towards a call-answering focus and away from the integrated approach focus. David Hall did not share 
that view either and left the project. This narrowed down the stakeholder base.   There were also hopes 
to keep the customer contact centre internal. According to one executive:   
“we’d been working on the assumption that the call centre would…. probably be internally 
run and managed and it was a bit of a shock … some people had sort of seen roles for themselves 
within the subsequent development of the organisation and I’m going to run this and I’m going to 
be doing that as we were sort of bought into it, and that was suddenly taken away and it was going 
to be a managed service.  At that point a lot of people probably lost a little bit of interest.”(Richard 
Budden, Business Manager, Environmental Services) 
 
Other changes at the senior management level influenced subsequent developments. 
According to David Hall, deputy leader Andy Howell remained in the picture for a while providing 
support to Tony Glew and Sarah Wood. Sir Michael Lyons left with 12 months’ notice.  
     
 
 
4.7.6    User training issues in the ‘process’ of IT related change  
The training provided by Vertex to the contact centre agents was more in the form of 
descriptive knowledge, which included what the system can do and how the written scripts can be 
used to answer the incoming calls (Vincenti 1993; Nonaka et al. 1995; Herschbach 1995). However, 
there were some issues regarding the training. 
“I felt it was inadequate, I felt it was poorly managed, I didn’t feel that the trainers were aware of 
how to utilise the system any better than the people they were training.” (Abid Hayat, Contact 
Birmingham Duty Manager) 
 “They hadn’t for instance, (they didn’t deliver) very high quality training materials to go with the 
training so the staff were, having been trained, walking away and not having anything they could 
refer to.” (Tricia Thrupp)  
“I think we neglected, I think we could have spent more time on helping Vertex employees 
understand how the Council works.” (Julie Bullen) 
 
In our analysis this resulted from Vertex not having enough knowledge about BCC departmental 
culture. Their interactions with BCC were not on a prolonged basis, did not allow any creative 
abrasion to take place (Newell et al. 2002). Following Boland and Tenkasi (1996), this resulted in a 
training not based on mutual perspective taking. On our analysis, there was an agreement at senior 
management level that saw mutual psychological contracts in place. However, this agreement was not 
shared by the people on the floor. According to Leonard-Barton and Kraus (1985) it is important to 
plan for the transfer of knowledge from the old operations, in which people knew the materials and the 
product very well, to the new processes. In the BCC situation secondees from the back offices were 
put in the contact centre environment, but their knowledge was not exploited to complement and 
enhance the quality of the end-user training.  
In our analysis, the BCC senior management when signing the contract with Vertex had an 
illusion of consensus which did not expose the innermost feelings of individuals involved (Gee 1992). 
Hence it resulted in inadequate training material and lack of communication between the parties. The 
BCC staff were more trained and experienced with considerable codified knowledge regarding BCC 
and its culture. More than half of the contact centre staff were existing BCC staff as secondees. Their 
training needs were, in many cases,   different from those of newcomers (non-secondees).  
 
4.7.7     The system goes live: developments from March 2002 
According to Tricia Thrupp:  
“To start with, five BCC services were supposed to go on board with Frontline. This got reduced to 
three. It was very much a political directive as to which went in and which did not. BCC did an 
awful lot of work with Leisure, and then all of a sudden they dropped Leisure because Revenues 
became more important, so they just had to dump all the Leisure work.”   
Moreover, the pilot did not involve collective testing. Each department did their own tests 
with the system. This did not enable any close interaction between the different departments. As many 
respondents reported, differing psychological contracts undoubtedly inhibited the free flow of 
knowledge from one department to another. The sense of shared benefits which could have helped in 
the mobility of knowledge silos and hoarding was missing at the departmental level.  Just as seriously, 
there was no external customer involvement in the process of implementation of Frontline. In fact 
BCC had tried it before and it had not worked. According to Bob Carter: 
 “It was much better to take something to the citizens, get it changed and validated, rather than 
giving them a blank piece of paper and saying,  ‘This is what we are going to do. How do you want 
to do it?’”  
The system went live in March 2002. This included the contact centre using the Frontline 
solution/software, providing services for Environmental Waste, Neighbourhood Advice and Council 
Tax. Prior to that, from about July/August 2001, a pilot of the CRM system with Environmental 
Services was done. However, the system went live without physically having a contact centre in place. 
It was done in the existing office.  The product was used to see how it interacted with BCC’s back-end 
     
 
system, the values it generated and problems it caused.  There were some major issues with that pilot, 
around the technical side in getting it to talk correctly with the back-end system.  Another issue was 
that Environmental Services at that point were in the process of renewing their back-end system. 
Difficulties with the pilot indicate that, against Leonard-Barton and Kraus (1985) a clear purpose, well 
defined and communicated, was missing. 
 
4.8          ‘Outcomes’ in the CRM implementation at BCC:  From 2002-2004 
Outcomes in this case are discussed in terms of how the system process was shaped by the 
history, internal and external contexts, and how the content and process have affected the performance 
of the users of the system (Pettigrew 1997). We analyse how our findings resonate with the extant 
research literature. 
 
4.8.1     The window of opportunity for adoption starts to close (Orlikowski and Tyre 1994) 
As the users of the system became more familiar with the systems, the workarounds, shortcuts 
and ‘tricks of the trade’ started to surface (Vincenti 1984; Orlikowski & Iacano 2001). According to 
one non-secondee end-user, the call centre agents tried to use the Frontline CRM system as much as 
they could, but over time they realised that answering the calls was taking too long, so they made 
notes while answering the calls, using the system as little as possible.  
Interviews with the agents showed that they learned to take notes manually while on call and 
then, after the call, put the logs on the system - especially with agents from the revenue and benefits 
section. A brief interview with the recruitment section in early 2004 showed that they used Frontline 
CRM for salutation purposes only. They then had to log into the back office system separately. This 
applied in both Benefits and Revenues departments.  Thus, as system adaptation time passed, people 
were finding new ways of working with the Frontline system.  The system was getting adapted by the 
users rather than users adopting the system, as Orlikowski and Tyre (1994) found in their study also.   
 
4.8.2     Differing perceptions, interests and expectations (Long and Fahey 2000) 
Derek Lee from Neighbourhood Office claimed that his department was going to play a 
leading role in the CRM Frontline implementation. He argued: 
“My role then was Constituency Manager for some Neighbourhood Offices but also leading 
on IT issues generally. I had always had a direct link into central IT over our use of new 
technology, and at that time it was anticipated that the corporate call centre would become part of 
the network of Neighbourhood Offices.  So I was part of the initial set-up of that organisation and.. 
a lot of the tender documentation was based upon CRM work we did two or three years previously.” 
He further argued that the Contact Centre should have been under their responsibility, as the 
front line for BCC. However, the contact centre (Vertex) management at BCC has had differing 
perceptions. Some seemed to have an opinion that by 2004 CRM Frontline was now doing what it was 
supposed to do, in other words, providing help as a tool to answer the incoming calls. There are some 
who thought that it could do better than that: 
 “I manage the voice network at the City Council and we receive 40 million calls per annum from 
the public, a miniscule percentage of that is handled by the call centre, a miniscule percentage.  The 
potential for further cascading the CRM solution has not been tapped yet.” (David Hall)   
The benefit with the externally managed contact centre has been that there are, within the 
contract, clear quantifiable performance indicators. However there are other issues: 
“What it hasn’t addressed is the qualitative aspects. Whilst people now get through - and that was 
an initial huge win for the City because there was a lot of bad publicity around the fact that people 
couldn’t get through to us and to other departments, but  I don’t think there was much put in the 
contract around the qualitative issues, as I am now finding as a business user.”  
 
The eventual aim into late 2004 was that Frontline CRM would be a fully integrated solution 
and then BCC would start to get benefits. Training had improved, according to Abid Hayat, talking in 
late 2003. Some feedback from the staff has been picked up by the trainers and resulted in some 
improvements in training the newcomers, as recommended for example by Vincenti (1993). However, 
     
 
some of the contact centre advisors still do not see the Frontline system as a facilitating tool in their 
work.  The Frontline system was slow and broke down at least once or twice a day. There were too 
many screens to juggle with, and too many systems which fail to communicate with each other. 
Contact centre staff also showed their concerns regarding the management of different systems in use: 
 “I think in England they use too many Chiefs and not enough Indians.” (Abid Hayat) 
The contact centre managed by Vertex went live in March 2003. It was divided into three 
sections - advisors handling calls regarding environmental services and neighbourhood advice; 
benefits and revenue; and recruitment services (live early 2004). Advisors in all the sections used 
Frontline CRM system to read scripts, in order to correctly use the salutations. In handling 
environmental services calls, the Frontline system uses a middleware called ‘Connect’, to interact with 
the back-office system called ‘Panorama’. Call centre agents are able to provide help to callers on 
specific issues, for example missed bin collections. However, only BCC secondees are given access to 
the full version of Panorama. Thus non-secondees with a customer query pass on the information 
manually to the secondees in order to achieve a resolution.  
Secondees from BCC were trained separately from non-secondees in the Frontline CRM 
system.  A collective training of call centre staff could have provided an opportunity for the staff to 
interact with each other on an informal basis. Such interaction on an informal level might perhaps 
have helped to start the process of mutual perspective taking (Boland and Tenkasi 1996) and a shared 
ownership, potentially leading to ‘mutual high obligation’ psychological contracts thus facilitating 
knowledge transfer (Shore and Barksdale 1998). 
According to Abid Hayat, secondees carried with them the BCC culture, whereas the non-
secondees hired by Vertex to handle the incoming calls did not. Secondees were more aware of the 
process loop in handling incoming calls because of their BCC background. This knowledge possessed 
by the secondees has not been exploited fully. The training was short, only three to four weeks, and 
was different for secondees as compared to non-secondees (Wathne et al. 1996).  ‘T-shaped skills’ and 
‘knowing of what others know’ could not be fully developed due to the shortage of time and lack of 
prolonged cross-cultural interaction between secondees and non-secondees (Bakhtin 1981; Krauss and 
Fussell 1991; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Iansiti 1993).  According to Abid Hayat there is very little 
interaction between the three sections present at the contact centre. The chances of creative abrasion 
taking place are limited. The common coffee or lunch room is mainly used by the recruitment services. 
The limited interaction that takes place is in more formal types of setting. Lack of informal settings 
may work as an inhibitor to the transfer of tricks of the trade at the contact centre. This combined with 
lack of ‘mutual high obligation’ psychological contracts due to the departmental subculture (Shore and 
Barksdale 1998) and vertical knowledge silos have, in our analysis, undoubtedly inhibited knowledge 
transfer across the departments and between the front-office and back-office in a CRM environment 
 
5. Further Analysis 
 
We have included some preliminary analysis already in the process of structuring the case history.  
In this summary analysis section the framework adopted to structure and explain events and evidence 
longitudinally (Pettigrew 1985; Willcocks and Margetts 1994) is again used to highlights the key 
points raised in the analysis regarding the CRM Frontline implementation (see Figure 2). 
 
5.1        Emerging Issues  
In many ways the case history demonstrates not only the importance of previously neglected 
knowledge and psychological factors in systems implementation, but in particular how lack of 
knowledge sharing, failure of tacit knowledge transfer, and unconnected psychological contracts can 
inhibit systems implementation. Applying a longitudinal research approach also reveals the origins of 
these sub-optimal outcomes – at least sub-optimal from systems promoter, external customer and 
governmental stakeholder perspectives.  Referring to Figure 2, The origins can be found  in the 
historical decision to give departments autonomy over IT decisions and purchasing, resulting in 
departmental knowledge and psychological contractual silos; in the functional hierarchical structure of 
     
 
the organization creating both vertical and horizontal stratification  in knowledge possession and 
psychological loyalties; and in decisions to outsource bringing in to play further differential 
knowledge bases and psychological contracts without applying sufficiently the means to dissolve the 
resulting barriers to knowledge transfer, learning and mutual perspective-taking.  
These fissures in organization led to sub-cultures developing, embodying differing 
perceptions, interests and loyalties and objectives. In such circumstances politics breed, and become 
particularly visible in times of technological change (Pettigrew 1985; Willcocks et al. 2002), and as 
the case shows, during the development and implementation of a key system such as CRM  At the 
same time external contextual pressures forced organizational stakeholders into action, with one group 
clustered around the Strategic Director and Business Manager and what we have called the ‘call-
answering’ focus winning out against the integration approach supported more by  the Head of IT, and 
for which the vendor Lagan had been originally selected to support. In terms of internal context we 
identified many examples of knowledge hoarding in vertical solos and of differential psychological  
contracts resulting in subsequent non-cooperative, and less informed behaviours relative to systems 
implementation. All this made the process of systems implementation much more difficult than it 
could have been had the issue of knowledge sharing and enhancement, and shared psychological 
contracts been addressed through, for example, use of mediators to facilitate communication in non 
reciprocal relationships, training and education, team-building, changed ways of working and effective 
end-user involvement. 
 The process of change revealed real knowledge and psychological contractual issues. The 
project team at BCC went through its ups and downs. The CRM program manager resigned soon after 
the new business manager’s arrival. More people left, including the chief executive and the head of IT 
services as a result of a power struggle and conflicts (Jehn 1995). Frequent changes of personnel may 
not have allowed the group to attain cohesiveness contributing to a less productive output (Kirkman 
and Shapiro 1997). BCC re-aligned their strategy and moved back from a complete integration 
approach to having a call answering system with limited integration. These events can be related to 
knowledge and psychological contractual issues. Knowledge silos found at BCC were at different 
hierarchical levels. At senior management level the sub-cultural gap between Sarah Wood’s team and 
Tony Glew’s created a divide. The divide continued with David Hall getting replaced with a new 
business manager. Due to a lack of ‘mutual perspective taking’ and ‘shared understanding’ the 
psychological contracts were more imposed than ‘mutual high obligation’ in type (shore and 
Barksdale 1998). This inhibited the process of developing positive creative abrasion, thus resulting in 
knowledge hoarding in the silos. This research suggests that psychological contracts play an important 
role in knowledge transfer. It also suggests that imposed psychological contracts (employee under 
obligation) tend to promote power based relationships (shore and Barksdale 1998). Explicit elements 
of psychological contracts between senior management and end-users include a sense of obligation to 
work, and job security. Importantly implicit elements of psychological contracts remain hidden 
(Makin et al. 1996) producing illusions of consensus, which influence and inhibit adoption and 
acceptance of the CRM system. 
 
5.2        Outcomes 
It is particularly interesting to look at what happens where, in this particular systems 
implementation, the Process issues as listed in Figure 2 were not addressed. Knowledge transfer and 
development are all delayed because of low staff retention, imposed psychological contracts, low user 
involvement in the process of change, lack of external user involvement, declining senior management 
commitment, and limited user training. As Willcocks et al. (2002) and Walton (1989) have shown, 
these insufficiencies will have knock-on effects in terms of the Outcomes once the system has been 
implemented (see Figure 2).    





































 Figure 2.                       Summary of The Analysis Using Pettigrew (1985, 1991) & Willcocks and Margetts (1994) 
IT-Related Change 
Context (Internal) 
• Top down approach; Decision to 
take on board CRM was made at the 
senior management level by three 
executives.  
• Subculture gap between call 
answering focused subculture led by 
Sarah Wood (Strategic Director) 
and integration focussed subculture 
led by Tony Glew (Head of IT). 
• IT led culture vs. Business led 
culture at middle management level; 
e.g.  David Hall (CRM Programme 
Manager) vs. Julie Bullen (Business 
Manager). 
• Departmental vs. Corporate culture 
• Departmental silos. 




• Government deadlines and 
speed of new legislation 
• (BCC) has been given the task 
of ensuring that all the services 
are available to the citizens 
through electronic means by 
2005 
• Customers demanding better 






• Staff retention issues indicate that several 
stakeholders did not follow through the 
project; e.g. leaving of Tony Glew (Head 
of IT), David Hall (CRM Programme 
Manager), Bill Newman (consultant), Sir 
Michael Lyons (CEO).  
• End-user involvement came at a later stage 
• Lack of  External end-user involvement 
• User commitment was linked with 
imposed psychological contracts. 
• Management support thinned out as the 
project progressed 
• User training was done without taking into 
account the BCC culture and its 
expectation. 
• System went live a year after the contract 
was signed with Lagan. 
Content 
• Phased approach was used, however the 
project changed its course of direction; 
from integration approach to call 
answering focus 
• Lagan was chosen with integration 
approach in mind 
• Outsourcing the management of Call 
Centre to Vertex  
 
IT History at BCC 
 
• Lack of in-house expertise e.g. 
lack of programmers 
• Programming assignments were 
outsourced to IT NET 
• A culture decision within the 
organisation gave departments a 
lot of freedom 
• Central IT had a more supporting 
role. 
• Vanilla systems were bought 
without consideration of  a 




• Differing stakeholder perceptions, 
expectations and interests; e.g. 
Sarah Wood vs. Tony Glew, 
David Hall vs. Julie Bullen, 
secondees vs. non-secondees. 
• Differential interests and motives 
at different levels of hierarchy 
may not have helped in 
establishing mutual psychological 
contracts (Makin et al. 1996). 
• The system is getting adapted by 
the users rather than users 
adopting the system. 
• T-shaped skills and knowing of 
what others know could not be 
fully developed due to the 
shortage of time and lack of 
prolonged cross cultural 
interaction between secondees 
and non-secondees. 
• Secondees at Vertex are more 
aware of the process loop in 
handling incoming calls because 
of their BCC background. 
• Advisors at Vertex use Frontline 
CRM system only to read scripts, 
in order to correctly use the 
salutations. 
• The vertical silos, between the 
departments, need further 
investigation. 
• Knowledge transfer, retention and 
exploitation by stakeholders of 
the call handling loop need 
further investigation. 
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 Management support at senior management level was provided for the project. The support 
thinned out as senior people at BCC started to leave.  Also the training seems to have been rushed. The 
initial motive behind bringing in the CRM system at BCC was to get the calls answered. User 
commitment was linked very much with imposed psychological contracts (Rousseau 1995). At BCC 
users have subsequently found work-arounds in terms of using the manual methods to answer a call 
rather than using the CRM system itself. However, they do end up using the system to ensure the job 
requirement.  Users have not been able to see the shared benefits fully yet and hence the psychological 
contracts are not completely of ‘mutual high obligation’ type (Shore and Barksdale 1998). User 
commitment has potential links with job security (Davenport et al. 1998). Mutual perspective taking 
has not happened fully due to the secondee/ non-secondee relationship situation at BCC (Boland and 
Tenkasi 1996). Furthermore, the content of an apparently mutual perspective may not have been 
allowed to surface or be challenged thus avoiding any interpretations which could shake up the 
illusion of consensus between stakeholders of the system (Gee 1992). As the project progressed and 
the innermost feelings were exposed people started to leave the project. The achievement of a new 
definition of the situation in which all participants can share has yet (as at mid-2004) to take place at 
its full capacity (Habermas 1979). Subsequent user commitment may also have been affected by the 
lack of involvement in the decision making process in buying the system initially. Decisions to buy the 
systems were taken at senior management level. End-users were involved in the implementation 
process at a later stage. No external user involvement was taken into consideration. Training has been 
an issue. At BCC it was done without taking into account the BCC culture and its expectations.  
The system went live a year after the contract was signed with the vendor. Lagan 
(manufacturer of CRM Frontline) also brought in Cavendish to help with the integration of the back 
office systems. Subsequently BCC also outsourced their call centre management to Vertex. Some 
consequences of outsourcing included some people resigning from the project and secondee / non-
secondee relationship issues.  
Partly as a consequence of these factors, staff turnover at the floor level has been very high. 
This does not allow staff interactions to come to a state of mutual perspective-taking where shared 
learning can take place (Boland and Tenkasi 1996). At BCC people from Contact Birmingham do not 
have many interactions with the back office. The secondees feel left out at The Contact Centre. 
Furthermore their contract with BCC does not allow them to be upgraded to a team leader position 
Non-secondees, on the other hand, can get promoted. Relationships at the contact centre between the 
secondees and the outsourced management are more power-based in style. This has resulted in a 
scenario where BCC secondees with a lot of experience and BCC cultural knowledge feel inferior to 
their non-seconded colleagues. There has also been a high turnover of staff at senior level at BCC. 
This has not helped the project to get stabilised or the new staff to settle either. The resulting 
psychological contracts are more of an imposed than a ‘mutual high obligation’ type (Shore and 
Barksdale 1998). Creative abrasion that could facilitate the development of ‘T-shaped skills’ and 
transfer of ‘tricks of the trade’ rarely takes place. Stakeholders at different level of hierarchy interact 
with each other from within their silos and the transfer of knowledge has tended to remain limited to 
the silos. 
 The micro mechanisms, for example psychological contracts, underlying the development of  
‘mutual perspective’, ‘shared mental space’, ‘T-shaped skills’ and ‘knowing of what others know’ 
need further investigation in order to fully understand the elements that inhibit or facilitate the transfer 
of tricks of the trade and work-arounds across the sub-cultures of a post CRM implementation 
environment  
 
7.       Conclusion 
By mid-2004 BCC was at the adaptation and acceptance stage where BCC were trying to 
develop the system further, to promote the integration, and streamline the processes as much as 
possible. The impact of knowledge creation, retention and exploitation on the ongoing process of 
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implementation is of high importance to the organisational promoters of CRM, as is the building of 
improved psychological contracts based on optimal utilization of the system.    
The exploratory research here has sought to extend the analysis of IT implementation to CRM 
systems, and to include in that analysis knowledge issues – including tacit knowledge transfer, 
knowledge silos, psychological contracts. A longitudinal approach has elicited how contextual, 
cultural, political and structural factors have influenced propensity to share knowledge and pursue 
common cause in the CRM implementation and use at Birmingham City Council, and the factors that 
could alleviate knowledge bottlenecks and facilitate more optimal utilization of the system. While our 
initial research questions were cast in an exploratory form, the research has only confirmed what our 
initial reading of the literature led us to believe – that knowledge issues, and what constructs them, are 
not just implicit in all systems implementations, but can be key reasons why a system optimises or 
fails in the light of its different stakeholders’ interests.     
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